Order 7610.4J: Special Military Operations

Order 7610.4J: Special Military Operations

Effective Date: November 3, 1998
Includes: Change 1 (Effective July 3, 2000) and Change 2 (Effective July 12, 2001)

Chapter 7. ESCORT OF HIJACKED AIRCRAFT

Section 1. GENERAL
• 7-1-1. Purpose
• 7-1-2. Requests for Service
• 7-1-3. Handling Priority
• 7-1-4. Control Responsibilities for U.S. Airspace
• 7-1-5. Control Responsibilities for Canadian Airspace
• 7-1-6. Air/Ground Communications Security
• 7-1-7. Weather/Flight Safety Limitations
  
  Section 2. ESCORT PROCEDURES
• 7-2-1. Facility Notification
• 7-2-2. Pilot Notification
• 7-2-3. Vectors
• 7-2-4. Radar Requirements
• 7-2-5. Airport Limitations
• 7-2-6. Responsibilities Prior to Join-Up
• 7-2-7. Positioning Instructions
• 7-2-8. Termination Heading
  
  Section 3. REPLACEMENT/RECOVERY OF ESCORT AIRCRAFT
• 7-3-1. Replacement Responsibilities
• 7-3-2. Recovery Responsibilities
• 7-3-3. Return-to-Base
• 7-3-4. Refueling Operations
  
  Section 4. FORWARDING INFORMATION
• 7-4-1. FAA Headquarters Requirements
• 7-4-2. Position Reports Within NORAD Radar Coverage
• 7-4-3. Position Reports Outside NORAD Radar Coverage
  
  Section 5. MISSION TERMINATION
• 7-5-1. Termination Authority
• 7-5-2. Overflight Clearance

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Chapter 7. ESCORT OF HIJACKED AIRCRAFT

Section 1. GENERAL

7-1-1. PURPOSE

The FAA hijack coordinator (the Director or his designate of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security) on duty at Washington headquarters will request the military to provide an escort aircraft for a confirmed hijacked aircraft to:

a. Assure positive flight following.

b. Report unusual observances.

c. Aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency.

7-1-2. REQUESTS FOR SERVICE

The escort service will be requested by the FAA hijack coordinator by direct contact with the National Military Command Center (NMCC). Normally, NORAD escort aircraft will take the required action. However, for the purpose of these procedures, the term "escort aircraft" applies to any military aircraft assigned to the escort mission. When the military can provide escort aircraft, the NMCC will advise the FAA hijack coordinator the identification and location of the squadron tasked to provide escort aircraft. NMCC will then authorize direct coordination between FAA and the designated military unit. When a NORAD resource is tasked, FAA will coordinate through the appropriate SOCC/ROCC.

7-1-3. HANDLING PRIORITY

When the situation requires an expedited departure of the escort aircraft, the aircraft shall be afforded priority consideration over other departing aircraft.

7-1-4. CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR U.S. AIRSPACE

a. When hijacked aircraft is within FAA radar coverage, escort aircraft shall be controlled by the appropriate FAA facility.

b. When a hijacked aircraft is not within FAA radar coverage but within military radar coverage, escort aircraft may be controlled by the military for the escort phase only.

c. When escort aircraft are under military control, separation between the escort aircraft/hijacked aircraft and other IFR traffic is the responsibility of the FAA. Separation shall be provided through the application of appropriate altitude reservations as required.

d. When escort aircraft is under FAA control, standard air traffic control separation shall be applied. In no case shall any clearance or instruction to the aircraft compromise ATC standards.

e. When tanker aircraft are employed, the designated tankers and escort aircraft shall be under FAA control, and appropriate aerial refueling procedures shall apply.

7-1-5. CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CANADIAN AIRSPACE

Escort aircraft entering Canadian airspace from the U.S. shall be transferred to NORAD control
in accordance with FAA/NORAD procedures prior to the aircraft entering Canadian airspace. Escort aircraft entering U.S. airspace from Canada will be transferred from NORAD control in the same manner when transfer of control is effected. When the hijacked aircraft is not within the coverage of the NORAD surveillance system in Canada, the escort mission will be discontinued.

7-1-6. AIR/GROUND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY

Except when specifically directed otherwise by FAA headquarters, every precaution shall be taken to prevent the hijacker/s from gaining knowledge that an escort is being conducted. When communicating with escort aircraft, ensure that transmissions are made on a different frequency from the one being used to communicate with the hijacked aircraft and are not simultaneously broadcast on a frequency which can be overheard by the hijacked aircraft.

7-1-7. WEATHER/FLIGHT SAFETY LIMITATIONS

If weather conditions or other flight safety factors make the escort mission impractical, the mission shall be terminated by the controller or the pilot, and the FAA headquarters hijack coordinator shall be advised immediately. The pilot of the escort aircraft will keep the controller advised of adverse weather or any other hazardous conditions. The pilot will immediately terminate the mission if radio contact with the control facility is lost, maintaining the last assigned altitude and/or radio failure procedures unless the pilot has received specific instructions to the contrary.

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Section 2. ESCORT PROCEDURES

7-2-1. FACILITY NOTIFICATION

The FAA hijack coordinator will advise the appropriate center/control tower of the identification of the military unit and location tasked to provide the hijack escort. The center/control tower shall coordinate with the designated NORAD SOCC/ROCC/military unit advising of the hijack aircraft's location, direction of flight, altitude, type aircraft and recommended flight plan to intercept the hijack aircraft. The center/control tower shall file the coordinated flight plan.

7-2-2. PILOT NOTIFICATION

a. The control tower, on initial contact with the aircraft, shall inform the pilot of the nature of the mission.

EXAMPLE-
"Red dog five, this is a hijack escort mission."

b. If the aircraft is an air defense or tactical aircraft, the controller shall also request the pilot to complete an armament safety check.

EXAMPLE-
"Perform armament safety check."

7-2-3. VECTORS

Escort aircraft shall be vectored to a position 5 miles directly behind the hijacked aircraft. The vectors shall be planned to approach the hijacked aircraft from the rear to avoid the possibility of being observed and to position the escort aircraft at the same altitude, speed, and heading as the hijacked aircraft.

7-2-4. RADAR REQUIREMENTS

Normally, radar contact with both aircraft is required. However, if the pilot of the escort aircraft has the hijacked aircraft in visual contact, the mission may continue without radar contact.

7-2-5. AIRPORT LIMITATIONS

When the hijacked aircraft descends for the purpose of landing at an airport within the continental U.S., the escort aircraft will not follow the hijacked aircraft into airspace delegated to an approach control facility. The FAA facility controlling the aircraft or within whose airspace the aircraft is operating shall issue instructions to the pilot or to the military control facility for the aircraft to hold at a specified altitude and location and wait for further instructions.

7-2-6. RESPONSIBILITIES PRIOR TO JOIN-UP

Until the escort aircraft has joined-up with the hijacked aircraft, the pilot shall be kept informed of the hijacked aircraft heading, speed, altitude, and destination (if known); also, its range and position relative to the escort aircraft. For fighter/interceptor aircraft, the application of "optimum cruise" will normally ensure sufficient overtake during the "join-up" phase. Assign an altitude which is either the altitude of the hijacked aircraft or the optimum altitude requested by the escort aircraft pilot when the hijacked aircraft is at a lower altitude. Descend the escort aircraft to the altitude of the hijacked aircraft prior to reaching a point 30 miles from the target. When the hijacked aircraft is at a low altitude where communications between the escort aircraft and the control facility would be questionable, a second escort aircraft (which will normally be available when NORAD interceptors are being utilized) may be stationed at a higher altitude near the hijacked aircraft's position for relay of information between the control facility and the escort aircraft maintaining visual surveillance.

7-2-7. POSITIONING INSTRUCTIONS

Unless the escort pilot has a visual contact, plan the join-up at 30 miles and issue positioning instructions.

EXAMPLE-
"Echo Golf One Two, when contact is established, maintain surveillance. Approach no closer than five miles directly behind. Remain out of sight from cockpit or cabin, and report all actions observed."

NOTE-
The pilot will advise you when the hijacked aircraft has been acquired on airborne radar (if his aircraft is so equipped) and when visual contact has been achieved.

7-2-8. TERMINATION HEADING

When terminating the escort for purposes of recovery, repositioning, refueling, etc., issue a heading of at least 90 degrees from the hijacked aircraft's heading.

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Section 3. REPLACEMENT/RECOVERY OF ESCORT AIRCRAFT

7-3-1. REPLACEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

Replacement of escort aircraft which must be recovered prior to hijack mission termination will be accomplished automatically by the military. To aid the military in planning for replacement aircraft and recovery airfields, "fuel state" shall be obtained from the pilot and relayed as requested. Replacement aircraft, if available, will be dispatched to assume the airborne escort role prior to
the initiation of recovery procedures. When the escort aircraft is being controlled by an ARTCC/CERAP and replacement requirements are made known, the ARTCC/CERAP controlling the aircraft shall coordinate the replacement with the applicable NORAD Region/SOCC/ROCC as required. The hijack coordinator will be advised of replacement actions.

7-3-2. RECOVERY RESPONSIBILITIES

Recovery requirements and the selection of the recovery field is the responsibility of the military command. The hijack coordinator will advise the ARTCC/CERAP controlling the escort when
the escort is to be terminated. The facility will coordinate the recovery with the NORAD Region/SOCC/ROCC. The ARTCC/CERAP will relay to the pilot recovery decisions received from the NORAD Region/SOCC/ROCC; i.e., recovery base, base weather, and frequently inform the pilot of his position in relation to the selected recovery field.

7-3-3. RETURN-TO-BASE

Return-to-base shall be accomplished under FAA control. Escort aircraft under military control when the escort mission is terminated will be transferred to FAA control as soon as practicable.

7-3-4. REFUELING OPERATIONS

When refueling operations are conducted, the procedures in Chapter 10 shall apply.

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Section 4. FORWARDING INFORMATION

7-4-1. FAA HEADQUARTERS REQUIREMENTS

FAA facilities shall respond to directions issued by the FAA hijack coordinator concerning hijack incidents and keep Emergency Operations Staff (ADA-20) informed of the progress of the escort missions. ADA-20 will establish communications conferencing as required.

7-4-2. POSITION REPORTS WITHIN NORAD RADAR COVERAGE

When the hijacking activity is within coverage of the NORAD surveillance system, position
reports will be forwarded to the Cheyenne Mountain AFB/Air Defense Operations Center (CMAFB/ADOC) by NORAD units. To facilitate NORAD tracking, every attempt shall be made to ensure that the hijacked aircraft is squawking Mode 3/A, code 7500. The NORAD control facility shall be advised if the hijacked aircraft is squawking a different transponder code. The NORAD control facility will also be advised of the Mode 3/A code setting assigned to hijack escort aircraft when other than NORAD interceptor aircraft are being employed. This would
assist NORAD control facilities in monitoring the ongoing situation when non-NORAD resources are used.

7-4-3. POSITION REPORTS OUTSIDE NORAD RADAR COVERAGE

When the hijacking activity takes place outside NORAD radar coverage within the continental United States, the ARTCC/CERAP controlling the activity shall forward position reports to the appropriate NORAD/SOCC/ROCC Senior Director. The position reports shall be forwarded
as follows:

a. The initial report from the ARTCC/CERAP to the NORAD/SOCC/ROCC Senior Director shall include the following:

1. Call sign of the hijacked aircraft.

2. Time (UTC).

3. Position in latitude and longitude.

4. Heading.

5. Speed.

6. Altitude.

7. Position of escort aircraft with respect to hijacked aircraft, if requested.

EXAMPLE-
"Universal Four Thirty-one, one seven three zero zulu, position, 34°26'N - 81°03'W, heading one seven five, true airspeed four eight zero knots, flight level three seven zero."

b. Subsequent reports shall include all of the items in subparagraph a, above, except that items 4, 5, and 6 shall only be reported if different from the initial information.

c. When control of the hijacked aircraft is transferred to another ARTCC/CERAP, the transferring facility shall notify the ATCSCC.

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Section 5. MISSION TERMINATION

7-5-1. TERMINATION AUTHORITY

The escort mission may be terminated by FAA headquarters, the National Military Command Center, or major military command authority. Termination of the mission shall be relayed to the escort aircraft by the controlling facility.

7-5-2. OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE

Escort aircraft shall not be cleared to overfly boundaries of foreign countries other than Canada without overflight approval. The appropriate air traffic control facility will be informed of overflight approval prior to the hijacked aircraft exiting U.S. airspace. When the escort aircraft is being controlled by an FAA facility, overflight approval will be received through the FAA hijack coordinator. The pilot shall be informed of the overflight approval upon receipt.

Mineta III

Norman Mineta II

Norman Mineta..

...

lost in confusion!?

http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_911_timeline&day_of_9/11=dayOf911&startpos=300

Before 9:36 a.m.: Officials Claim NORAD is Monitoring Flight 93

According to one account given by NEADS Commander Robert Marr, some time before around 9:36 when it changes direction, while it is still flying west, Flight 93 is being monitored by NEADS. Marr describes how, “We don’t have fighters that way and we think [Flight 93 is] headed toward Detroit or Chicago.” He says he contacts a base in the area “so they [can] head off 93 at the pass.” Not only does NORAD know about the flight, but also, according to NORAD Commander Larry Arnold, “We watched the 93 track as it meandered around the Ohio-Pennsylvania area and started to turn south toward DC.” (This change of direction occurs around 9:36 a.m.) [Filson, 2004] This account completely contradicts the 9/11 Commission’s later claim that NEADS is first notified about Flight 93 at 10:07 a.m. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]

(9:36 a.m.-10:06 a.m.): Military Claims it is Tracking Flight 93 and Ready to Shoot it Down; 9/11 Commission Says Otherwise

Several senior officials claim that the US military is tracking Flight 93 as it heads east and is ready to shoot it down if necessary.
bullet Brigadier General Montague Winfield says that the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) has “received the report from the FAA that Flight 93 had turned off its transponder, had turned, and was now heading towards Washington, DC.” He adds, “The decision was made to try to go intercept Flight 93.” [ABC News, 9/11/2002]
bullet Major General Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region, says, “I was personally anxious to see what 93 was going to do, and our intent was to intercept it.” Three fighters have taken off from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia (see 9:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). According to Arnold, “we launched the aircraft out of Langley to put them over top of Washington, DC, not in response to American Airline 77, but really to put them in position in case United 93 were to head that way.” [9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003] He says, “as we discussed it in the conference call, we decided not to move fighters toward 93 until it was closer because there could have been other aircraft coming in,” but adds, “I had every intention of shooting down United 93 if it continued to progress toward Washington, DC… whether we had authority or not.” [Filson, 2004, pp. 73]
bullet NEADS Commander Robert Marr is reportedly “focused on United Flight 93, headed straight toward Washington.” He concurs with Arnold, saying, “United Airlines Flight 93 would not have hit Washington, DC. He would have been engaged and shot down before he got there.” [Filson, 2004, pp. 73] Marr and Arnold both say they were tracking Flight 93 even earlier on, while it was still it was still heading west (see Before 9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001).
Yet, completely contradicting these claims, the 9/11 Commission will conclude that the military only learned about Flight 93 around the time it crashed. It says the NMCC learned of the hijacking at 10:03 a.m. (see 10:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). Based upon official records, including recordings of the NEADS operations floor, it says NEADS never followed Flight 93 on radar and was first alerted to it at 10:07 a.m. . [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 30-31, 34 and 42; Washington Post, 4/30/2006; Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006]

UA93

09:28:16 ![may day mayday] get out of here!

...unauthorized change of altitude...

09:28:48 !get out of here get out of here!

Cleveland: (United fifteen twenty-three, did you hear your company, er, did you hear some interference on the frequency here, a couple minutes ago, screaming?)
Cleveland: (UA93 verify you're FL350)

09:31:55 !please seat down. Keep remain seated we have a bomb on board!


(Executive 956: Sir, did you hear the transmission unintelligible he probably just said he had a bomb on board.

Cleveland: Uh, say again, uh, is that United ninety-three?

Executive 956: In that transmission he said was unreadable it sounded like someone said they had a bomb on board.)
ua93 climbs again (up to 40000 feet)

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9:28 a.m. (or Before): Erratic Flight 93 Movements Noticed by Cleveland Flight Controller

Stacey Taylor.Stacey Taylor. [Source: NBC News]Cleveland flight controller Stacey Taylor has been warned to watch transcontinental flights heading west for anything suspicious. She later recalls, “I hear one of the controllers behind me go, ‘Oh, my God, oh my God,’ and he starts yelling for the supervisor. He goes, ‘What is this plane doing? What is this plane doing?’ I wasn’t that busy at the time, and I pulled it up on my screen and he was climbing and descending and climbing and descending, but very gradually. He’d go up 300 feet, he’d go down 300 feet. And it turned out to be United 93.” (Note the time of this incident is not specified, but presumably it is prior to when Cleveland controllers note Flight 93 descends 700 feet at 9:29 a.m. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002]

(9:29 a.m.): Confirmation of Strange Sounds Coming from Flight 93; NORAD Not Notified

Shortly after hearing strange noises from the cockpit of Flight 93, Cleveland flight controllers notice the plane has descended about 700 feet. John Werth, the controller who is handling the plane, tells the supervisor nearest to him, “I think we have another one [i.e., another hijacking].” He will repeatedly radio the cockpit over the next four minutes, asking the pilot to confirm the hijacking, but receive no response. At 9:30 a.m., a controller asks other nearby flights on his frequency if they’ve heard screaming; several say that they have. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004; CBS News, 9/10/2006]

(9:32 a.m.): FAA Notifies United Airlines About Flight 93

The FAA notifies United Airlines’ headquarters that Flight 93 is not responding to radio calls. This lack of response, combined with the plane’s turning to the east, causes United to believe, by 9:36 a.m., that the plane has been hijacked. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 456]

(9:32 a.m.): Flight 93 Hijacker Tells Passengers Bomb Is Onboard; Flight Controllers Overhear

According to the 9/11 Commission’s account, the hijacker’s voice says, “Keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board.” The controller understands, but chooses to respond, “Calling Cleveland [flight control], you’re unreadable. Say again, slowly.” Apparently there’s no answer. The controller notifies his supervisor, who soon passes the notice to FAA headquarters. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]

(9:33 a.m.): FAA Notifies Video Conference United 93 Is Suspected Hijack
Edit event

FAA Administrator Jane Garvey notifies the video conference chaired by counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke that all aircraft have been ordered to land at the nearest field and reads a list of potential hijacks including Delta 1989 and United 93. [Clarke, 2004, pp. 5] Although, according to Clarke’s account, both General Richard Myers and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld are present at the conference at this point, the 9/11 Commission will later claim that the military was not notified about the hijacking of United 93 until over half an hour later (see 10:03 a.m. September 11, 2001).

9:34 a.m.: FAA’s Headquarters Notified There Might Be a Bomb Onboard Flight 93; NORAD Not Notified

According to the 9/11 Commission, word of Flight 93’s hijacking reaches FAA headquarters. By this time, headquarters has established an open line of communication with the FAA Command Center at Herndon, Virginia. It had instructed the center to poll all flight control centers about suspect aircraft. So, at this time, the Command Center passes on Cleveland’s message: “United 93 may have a bomb on board.” The FAA headquarters apparently does not forward this information to the military, despite having the responsibility for doing so. Ben Sliney, the FAA’s national operations manager at its Herndon Command Center, will later recount, “I do know that all the information was being relayed to headquarters and, at least as far as we were concerned, it should have been. We thought it had been given to the military at each juncture.” The Command Center continually updates FAA headquarters on Flight 93 until it crashes. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004; CBC, 9/12/2006]

(9:36 a.m.): Cleveland Flight Control Wants NORAD Notified; FAA Command Center Says People Are Working on It

According to the 9/11 Commission, at about this time Cleveland flight control specifically asks the FAA Command Center whether someone has requested the military to launch fighters toward Flight 93. Cleveland offers to contact a nearby military base. The Command Center replies that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command have to make that decision and are working on the issue. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]

Cleveland overheard a hijacker say there was a “bomb on board” at 9:32 a.m. and passed the message to FAA higher ups (see (9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to John Werth, the Cleveland controller handling Flight 93, “Within three or four minutes, probably, of when [the hijacking] happened, I asked if the military was advised yet. Had anybody called the military? They said, ‘don’t worry. That’s been taken care of,’ which I think to them, meant they had called the command center in Washington.” [CBS News, 9/10/2006]

(9:39 a.m.): Flight 93 Hijacker Again Warns of Bomb on Board, Flight Controllers Again Overhear;
NORAD Still Not Notified

The Flight 93 hijackers (probably inadvertently) transmit over the radio: “Hi, this is the captain. We’d like you all to remain seated. There is a bomb on board. And we are going to turn back to the airport. And they had our demands, so please remain quiet.” [Boston Globe, 11/23/2001; Longman, 2002, pp. 209; MSNBC, 9/3/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] The controller responds, “United 93, understand you have a bomb on board. Go ahead,” but there is no response. There was a very similar “bomb on board” warning from the same flight at 9:32 a.m. (see (9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The 9/11 Commission indicates that these are separate incidents. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] Cleveland flight control apparently continues to wait for FAA superiors to notify NORAD. Earlier in the morning, Boston flight control directly contacted NORAD (see (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and local air force bases when they determined Flight 11 was hijacked.

(9:40 a.m.): Flight 93 Transponder Signal Turned Off; Flight Still Closely Tracked

The transponder signal from Flight 93 ceases. [CNN, 9/17/2001; MSNBC, 9/3/2002; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] However, the plane can be—and is—tracked using primary radar by Cleveland flight controllers and at United headquarters. Altitude can no longer be determined, except by visual sightings from other aircraft. The plane’s speed begins to vary wildly, fluctuating between 600 and 400 mph before eventually settling around 400 mph. [Longman, 2002, pp. 77, 214; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]

NORAD Still Not Notified

After 9:40 a.m.: NEADS Talks to Cleveland Flight Control about Hijacking, United 93 Not Mentioned

After learning that Delta flight 1989 may have been hijacked from Boston flight control (see 9:41 a.m. September 11, 2001), NEADS calls Cleveland flight control, which is handling the flight, to discuss this. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 14] Although Cleveland flight control has been aware that United 93 has been hijacked since before 9:30, it apparently fails to mention this to NEADS. According to the 9/11 Commission, the NMCC is not notified of United 93’s hijacking until 10:03 (see 10:03 a.m. September 11, 2001).

9:49 a.m.: FAA Headquarters Continues to Delay Decision on Contacting NORAD About Flight 93

According to the 9/11 Commission, the FAA Command Center has just twice warned FAA headquarters that United 93 is now “29 minutes out of Washington, DC.” Someone at headquarters says to someone at the Command Center, “they’re pulling Jeff [last name unknown] away to go talk about United 93.” Command Center replies, “Uh, do we want to think about, uh, scrambling aircraft [NORAD fighters]?” FAA headquarters replies, “Uh, God, I don’t know.” Command Center says, “Uh, that’s a decision somebody’s gonna have to make probably, in the next ten minutes.” FAA headquarters answers, “Uh, ya know, everybody just left the room.” [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]

9:53 a.m.: FAA Headquarters Still Only Talking About Telling NORAD of Flight 93 Hijack

According to the 9/11 Commission, FAA headquarters informs the FAA Command Center that the deputy director for air traffic services is talking to Deputy Administrator Monte Belger about scrambling aircraft after Flight 93. Yet in interviews with the commission, neither Belger nor the deputy director recall this discussion, and Belger subsequently e-mails the commission saying he does not believe the conversation took place. However, tape recordings reveal a staff person from headquarters at this time telling the Command Center, “Peter’s talking to Monte now about scrambling.” FAA headquarters is also informed that the flight is 20 miles northwest of Johnstown, Pennsylvania. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 461] When questioned about this, Belger will point out that there are military people on duty at the FAA Command Center and in a situation room at the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization, and that they are participating in what is going on. In addition, Belger will later tell the commission that he thought the NMCC was on the hijack net and would therefore have received notification on this channel at the same time as all other agencies. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] Incredibly, FAA headquarters has known since 9:34 A.M. about hijackers talking about a bomb on board the flight, and more evidence has since been passed on confirming a hijacking in progress. Still, reportedly, no one tells NORAD anything about the plane.

10:03 a.m.: NMCC Learns of Flight 93 Hijacking, NORAD Still Not Told

According to the 9/11 Commission, the NMCC learns about the Flight 93 hijacking at this time. Since the FAA has not yet been patched in to the NMCC’s conference call, the news comes from the White House. The White House learned about it from the Secret Service, and the Secret Service learned about it from the FAA. NORAD apparently is still unaware. Four minutes later, a NORAD representative on the conference call states, “NORAD has no indication of a hijack heading to Washington, D.C., at this time.” [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]

10:07 a.m.: Cleveland Flight Control Updates NEADS

According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS finally receives a call from Cleveland flight control about Flight 93, saying it has a bomb on board. Cleveland says it has lost the plane’s transponder, but passes on its last known latitude and longitude. NEADS is unable to locate it on radar because it has already crashed. By the commission’s account, this is NORAD’s first notification about the Flight 93 hijacking, even though Cleveland realized Flight 93 was hijacked at 9:32 a.m., 35 minutes earlier, and notified FAA headquarters at 9:34 a.m., 33 minutes earlier. A former senior FAA executive, speaking on condition of anonymity, will later try to explain this failure, saying, “Our whole procedures prior to 9/11 were that you turned everything [regarding a hijacking] over to the FBI.” [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004; Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006] However, military instructions contradict this, saying, “In the event of a hijacking, the NMCC will be notified by the most expeditious means by the FAA.” (The NMCC is the National Military Command Center, located within the Pentagon.) [US Department of Defense, 7/31/1997 US Department of Defense, 6/1/2001 ]

...In the event of a hijacking, the NMCC will be notified by the most expeditious means by the FAA...

What About Standard Procedures?

AA77

(8:56-9:05 a.m.): Flight 77 Disappears from Radar Screens

According to the 9/11 Commission, “Radar reconstructions performed after 9/11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked [Flight 77] from the moment its transponder was turned off at 8:56 [am.].” However, for eight minutes and 13 seconds, this primary radar data is not displayed to Indianapolis flight controllers.(this is why 9/11 commission says Indy ATC thought about crash at that time). “The reasons are technical, arising from the way the software processed radar information, as well as from poor primary radar coverage where American 77 was flying.” [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]

...So the Commission thinks that at first, Flight 77 slided into a radar hole and was therefore not visible to controllers. This raises the question why the controllers, who surely were familiar with the position and extent of this alleged radar hole, were so quickly convinced that Flight 77 had crashed...



(9:20 a.m.): FAA Command Center Notifies Field Facilities That Flight 77 Is Lost; Indianapolis Flight Control Reportedly Finally Learns of National Crisis

According to the 9/11 Commission, Indianapolis flight control learns that there are other hijacked aircraft by this time (presumably at least Flights 11 and 175). Millions of people have known about the crashes since CNN and all other media began broadcasting images from New York at 8:48 a.m., but Indianapolis is reportedly unaware until this time. The Indianapolis flight controllers begin to doubt their assumption that Flight 77 has crashed and consider that it might be hijacked. After a discussion between the Indianapolis manager and the FAA Command Center, the Command Center notifies some other FAA facilities that Flight 77 is lost. By 9:21 a.m., the Command Center, some FAA field facilities, and American Airlines join the search for Flight 77. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]

9:21 a.m.: FAA Command Center Advises Dulles Airport Control to Be on Lookout

According to the 9/11 Commission, the FAA Command Center advises the Dulles Airport terminal control facility in Washington to look for primary targets. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]

(0924am)
The FAA’s Great Lakes Regional Operations Center notifies the Operations Center at FAA’s Washington headquarters of the simultaneous loss of radar identification and radar communications with Flight 77. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/17/2001 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 32

(9:24 a.m.): By Some Accounts, FAA Notifies NORAD Flight 77 Is Hijacked and Washington-Bound; 9/11 Commission Claims This Never Happens

Shortly after 9/11, NORAD reported that the FAA notified them at this time that Flight 77 “may” have been hijacked and that it appears headed toward Washington. [Washington Post, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001; North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/18/2001; Guardian, 10/17/2001; Associated Press, 8/19/2002] Apparently, flight controllers at Dulles International Airport discover a plane heading at high speed toward Washington; an alert is sounded within moments that the plane appears to be headed toward the White House. [Washington Post, 11/3/2001] In 2003, the FAA supported this account, but claimed that they had informally notified NORAD earlier. “NORAD logs indicate that the FAA made formal notification about American Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m. (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but information about the flight was conveyed continuously during the phone bridges before the formal notification.” [Federal Aviation Administration, 5/22/2003] Yet in 2004, the 9/11 Commission claims that both NORAD and the FAA are wrong. The 9/11 Commission explains that the notification NEADS received at 9:24 a.m. was the incorrect information that Flight 11 had not hit the WTC and was headed south for Washington, D.C. Thus, according to the 9/11 Commission, NORAD is never notified by the FAA about the hijacking of Flight 77, but accidentally learns about it at 9:34 a.m. (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]


9:25 a.m.: FAA Command Center Finally Tells FAA Headquarters About Flight 77

According to the 9/11 Commission, the FAA Command Center advises FAA headquarters that American 77 is lost in Indianapolis flight control’s airspace, that Indianapolis has no primary radar track, and is looking for the aircraft. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]

..finally..

9:34 a.m.: FAA Mentions in Passing to NORAD That Flight 77 Is Missing

According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS contacts Washington flight control to ask about Flight 11. A manager there happens to mention, “We’re looking—we also lost American 77.” The commission claims, “This was the first notice to the military that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance.… No one at FAA Command Center or headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77.” (9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004)

...In the event of a hijacking, the NMCC will be notified by the most expeditious means by the FAA...

Intercept Procedures III

At 9:20 a.m. (or earlier, according to some accounts: http://vmf214-blacksheep.blogspot.com/2007/08/laura-brown-from-faa.html ), the FAA set up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies .
FAA records indicate that the National Military Command Center within the Pentagon was included in the communication network “no later than 9:20 a.m.”(9/11 commission) Yet at some point later in the morning, Acting FAA Deputy Administrator Monte Belger becomes aware that the military is not involved in the teleconference in any meaningful way. Presumably referring to tape recordings of the FAA headquarters, 9/11 Commissioner Jamie Gorelick will later say to Belger, “We heard some rather colorful language came from your mouth at that point.” The absence of the NMCC from the teleconference is unusual. Belger says, “I’ve lived through dozens of hijackings in my 30-year FAA career… and [the NMCC] were always there. They were always on the net, and were always listening in with everybody else.” He adds, “The most frustrating after-the-fact scenario for me to understand is to explain… the communication link on that morning between the FAA operations center and the NMCC.… I know how it’s supposed to work, but… it’s still a little frustrating for me to understand how it actually did work on that day.” (9/11 commission)

UA175

(8:52 a.m.): New York Flight Controller Tracks Flight 175 into New York

Mike McCormick, head of New York flight control center, sees the first WTC attack on CNN. He assumes that Flight 175, which he is tracking on his radar screen, is also headed into the WTC. He says, “Probably one of the most difficult moments of my life was the 11 minutes from the point I watched that aircraft, when we first lost communications until the point that aircraft hit the World Trade Center. For those 11 minutes, I knew, we knew, what was going to happen, and that was difficult.” [CNN, 8/12/2002]

(8:55 a.m.) The head New York flight controller notifies a manager at the facility that she believes Flight 175 has been hijacked. The manager tries to notify regional managers about this, but cannot reach them because they are discussing the hijacking of Flight 11 and refuse to be disturbed. However, even though the controller managing Flight 175 said, “we may have a hijack” at 8:53 a.m., the 9/11 Commission concluded that NORAD is not notified by this time. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]

!?

Intercept Procedures II

9:00 am

The deputy director of operations and his assistant in the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) have been notifying senior Pentagon officials of the first WTC tower being hit. At around 9 a.m., the senior NMCC operations officer contacts the Operations Center at FAA headquarters asking for information, and is informed of the hijacking of Flight 11. This is the earliest time mentioned by the 9/11 Commission Report that the NMCC learns of this hijacking.
9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 35


Time Boston Center Starts Notifying Chain of Command: 0825 am
AA11 time of crash: 0846 am


...In the event of a hijacking, the NMCC will be notified by the most expeditious means by the FAA...

Intercept Procedures

JULY 97

In the event of a hijacking, the NMCC will be notified by the most expeditious means by the FAA. The NMCC will monitor the situation and forward all requests or proposals for DOD military assistance for aircraft piracy (hijacking) to the Secretary of Defense for approval.

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3610_01.pdf

JUNE 01

In the event of a hijacking, the NMCC will be notified by the most expeditious means by the FAA. The NMCC will, with the exception of immediate responses as authorized by reference D, forward requests for DOD assistance to the Secretary of Defense for approval.


http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3610_01a.pdf

(enclosure D, references)
"d. DOD Directive 3025.15, 18 February 1997, “Military Assistance to
Civil Authorities"

link DOD Directive 3025.15, 18 February 1997 :

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302515p.pdf

punto 4

4) policy

4.7.1 Immediate Response. Requests for an immediate response (i.e., any
form of immediate action taken by a DoD Component or military commander to save
lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently
serious conditions) may be made to any Component or Command. The DoD
Components that receive verbal requests from civil authorities for support in an exigent
emergency may initiate informal planning and, if required, immediately respond as
authorized in DoD Directive 3025.1 (reference (g)). Civil authorities shall be
informed that verbal requests for support in an emergency must be followed by a written
request. As soon as practical, the DoD Component or Command rendering assistance
shall report the fact of the request, the nature of the response, and any other pertinent
information through the chain of command to the DoD Executive Secretary, who shall
notify the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and any other
appropriate officials. If the report does not include a copy of the civil authorities'
written request, that request shall be forwarded to the DoD Executive Secretary as soon
as it is available.

Laura Brown from FAA

e ancora:

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-8816050122607364144

pearl jam